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Abstract
Whether living tissue and donation by minors is acceptable is the subject of considerable
debate. In view of the vulnerable position of minors, the risks involved in the medical
procedure, and the possible conflict of interests on the part of the parents, the legal
approach in Europe has traditionally been very restrictive. However, this approach may
raise concerns when a situation would arise where donation by a minor would still be in
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that person’s best interests. Moreover, a very restrictive approach may be difficult to
reconcile with the requirement to give due weight to the views of minors in accordance
with their age and maturity. In the light of these considerations, this article examines
whether there is room to improve the way in which living tissue and organ donation by
minors is currently regulated across Europe. We first sketch the debate about the
acceptability of using minors as living donors and explore its potential clinical need.
Subsequently, we assess whether international legal instruments and guidelines offer any
guidance to address the issues raised. This is followed by an analysis of the legal situation
in the United States. Finally, we examine in detail the legal situation in Europe. To that
aim, relevant regulations were compiled, translated, and analyzed in close cooperation
with national legal experts. By way of conclusion, we compare the legal approach fol-
lowed in the great majority of European countries with the one preferred in the United
States and make suggestions to amend European transplant regulations to better protect
the interests of minors.
Keywords
Comparative health law, living organ donation, living tissue donation, minors, transplant
regulations
Introduction: Considering minors as living donors
Living donation is a lifesaving treatment option for patients suffering from end-stage
organ failure or diseases such as leukemia, lymphoma, and sickle-cell anemia. Although,
as a rule, only adults are considered as living donors, on occasion a minor may emerge as
the most suitable tissue or organ donor for a close relative in desperate need of trans-
plantation. Whether living donation by minors is ethically acceptable is the subject of
considerable debate.
Critics warn that, in contrast to adults, minors often find themselves in a position of
vulnerability that can easily be exploited.1 Compared to adults, who have every right to
decline donation even if they are the donor of last resort,2 minors may find it almost
impossible to refuse donation to a sibling if they are solicited by their parents. Similarly,
concerns have been raised about the appropriateness of exposing minors to the consid-
erable risks that may be involved, especially taking into consideration that this medical
procedure is not to their own medical benefit.3 In this regard, donation of bone marrow or
1. K. Bonk, ‘Minors as Living Organ Donors: Protecting Minors from Martyrdom’, Children’s
Legal Rights Journal 28 (2008), pp. 45–73; M. Goodwin, ‘My Sisters Keeper?: Law,
Children and Compelled Donation’, Western New England Law Review 29 (2007),
pp. 357–404; B.A. Schenberg, ‘Harvesting Organs from Minors and Incompetent Adults
to Supply the Nation’s Organ Drought’, Indiana Health Law Review 3 (2007), pp. 319–359.
2. See, for the United States, the illustrative case of McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa & C 3d 90 (July 26,
1978).
3. See, for instance, C. Cheyette, ‘Organ Harvests from the Legally Incompetent: An Argument
against Compelled Altruism’, Boston College Law Review 41 (2000), pp. 465–515.
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hematopoietic stem cells is generally considered quite unproblematic because of its
capacity to regenerate and the very small risk of complications.4 By contrast, the risks
of living kidney donation are more than minimal, with perioperative mortality estimated
at 0.031% and serious morbidity as high as 7%.5 Recent evidence also suggests that
living kidney donors are at increased long-term risk for developing end-stage renal
disease.6 The risks involved in living liver donation are already very significant, with
mortality approaching 0.1% for left lobe donation and 0.5% for right lobe donation and
with an overall incidence of serious morbidity estimated at 15–20%.7
In the light of the vulnerable position of minors, the risks involved in the medical
procedure and the severe conflict of interests if the decision is left to the discretion of the
parents acting as surrogates for both the minor donor and recipient, we completely agree
that a cautious approach is warranted. Whereas the use of minors as donors of bone
marrow or hematopoietic stem cells is of less concern in view of the minimal risks
involved, critics are correct to point out that living organ donation by minors may pose
severe moral problems. Nevertheless, we do not advocate a statutory total ban on living
organ donation by minors. Such a ban—which, as will be highlighted below, seems to be
the preferred solution in Europe—should be rejected for a variety of reasons.
First, categorically refusing minors the possibility to donate may be unfair if this
would mean that a genuine willingness to donate on their part would be uniformly
disregarded.8 More specifically, an absolute prohibition is difficult to reconcile with the
tendency to grant minors who can demonstrate maturity a high degree of
4. See D.L. Confer, ‘Hematopoietic Cell Donors’, in K.G. Blume, S.J. Forman and F.R.
Appelbaum, eds., Thomas’ Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation (Malden: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004), pp. 538–549. However, according to more recent reports a small risk
of fatalities and serious adverse events still exists. See, for instance, J. Halter, Y. Kodera,
A.U. Ispizua, et al., ‘Severe Events in Donors After Allogeneic Hematopoietic Stem Cell
Donation’, Haematologica 94(1) (2009), pp. 94–101.
5. See G. Mjøen, O. Øyen, H. Holdaas, et al., ‘Morbidity and Mortality in 1022 Consecutive
Living Donor Nephrectomies: Benefits of a Living Donor Registry’, Transplantation 88(11)
(2009), pp. 1273–1279; D.L. Segev, A.D. Muzaale, B.S. Caffo, et al., ‘Perioperative
Mortality and Long-term Survival Following Live Kidney Donation’, Journal of the
American Medical Association 303(10) (2010), pp. 959–966.
6. G. Mjøen, S. Hallan, A. Hartmann, et al., ‘Long-term Risks for Kidney Donors’, Kidney
International 86 (2014), pp. 162–167; A.D. Muzaale, A.B. Massie, M.C. Wang, et al., ‘Risk
of End-stage Renal Disease Following Live Kidney Donation’, Journal of the American
Medical Association 311(6) (2014), pp. 579–586.
7. See L. Kousoulas, T. Becker, N. Richter, et al., ‘Living Donor Liver Transplantation: Effect
of the Type of Liver Graft Donation on Donor Mortality and Morbidity’, Transplant
International 24(3) (2011), pp. 251–258; J.B. Otte, ‘Donor Complications and Outcomes
in Live-liver Transplantation’, Transplantation 75(10) (2003), pp. 1625–1626; Y. Yuan and
G. Mitsukazu, ‘Biliary Complications in Living Liver Donors’, Surgery Today 40(5) (2010),
pp. 411–417.
8. J.K. Robbennolt, V. Weisz and C.M. Lawson, ‘Advancing the Rights of Children and
Adolescents to be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors’, Journal of Law and
Health 9 (1995), pp. 213–245.
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self-determination in medical decision-making.9 Although this competence does not
generally extend to high-risk and nontherapeutic procedures, the opinion of mature
minors is frequently considered of decisive importance in other interventions affecting
them. Moreover, granted that minors may not have sufficient decisional capacity to
autonomously decide to donate an organ, a strong desire to donate will still be a crucial
factor in the assessment of surrogate decision makers as to the acceptable risk–benefit
balance of the procedure.
Second, as will be pointed out in the discussion of United States case law, living organ
donation may exceptionally be beneficial to the minor donor. This situation may arise
where the minor is the only suitable donor for a loved one whose life is in imminent
danger. Under such exceptional circumstances, living organ donation may result in psy-
chosocial benefits to the minor that are substantial enough to significantly outweigh the
medical risks involved. The minor may, for instance, derive important psychosocial ben-
efits from having saved the life of a loved one and from growing up in an intact family.10 In
this light, we argue that the door for such a practice should not be closed by legislators.
Third, a general prohibition of living organ donation by minors may lead to a situation
where judges, petitioned to allow living organ donation by a minor, may, out of a sense
of fairness, feel forced to reach a judgment that goes against domestic law. Such a legally
complicated case emerged in 2007 in Spain, a country where living organ donation by
minors is categorically prohibited. The case involved a 17-year-old girl, Gabriela, who
wanted to donate a liver segment to her baby daughter. Since the baby was in a critical
condition, it was impossible to wait until Gabriela reached adulthood. Therefore, Gab-
riela’s mother applied to the Court of First Instance of Seville, which, taking account of
the emergency situation and the overriding interests of Gabriela to save her daughter’s
life, gave judicial authorization for the liver donation, acknowledging that its verdict was
contrary to national law.11 Although the ruling was felt to be just, Spanish legal doctrine
9. L. Stultie¨ns, T. Goffin, P. Borry, et al., ‘Minors and Informed Consent: A Comparative
Approach’, European Journal of Health Law 14 (2007), pp. 21–46.
10. See N. Broeckx, ‘Living Organ Donation and Minors: A Major Dilemma’, European Journal
of Health Law 20 (2013), pp. 41–62; R.W. Griner, ‘Live Organ Donations between Siblings
and the Best Interest Standard: Time for Stricter Judicial Intervention’, Georgia State
University Law Review 10(3) (1994), pp. 589–613; S. Month, ‘Preventing Children from
Donating May Not Be in Their Best Interests’, British Medical Journal 312 (1996), pp.
240–241; S.L. Nygren, ‘Organ Donation by Incompetent Patients: A Hybrid Approach’,
University of Chicago Legal Forum (2006), pp. 471–502; L.F. Ross, ‘Moral Grounding
for the Participation of Children as Organ Donors’, Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics
21(2) (1993), pp. 251–257; B. Shartle, ‘Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the
Increasing Number of Living Organ and Tissue Donations by Minors’, Louisiana Law
Review 61(2) (2001), pp. 433–471; D. Steinberg, ‘Kidney Transplants from Young
Children and the Mental Retarded’, Theoretical Medicine 25(4) (2004), pp. 229–234.
11. A summary of the case (in Spanish) can be found at: https://www.rexurga.es/descarga/J[1].
Primera%20Instancia%20Sevilla%20%28984-07%29.pdf (accessed 17 June 2016). We wish
to thank Professor Pablo de Lora Deltoro for drawing our attention to this case.
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was deeply troubled by the fact that it was illegal in technical terms.12 In order to
preclude such a judicial–legislative conflict, we suggest that a complete legislative ban
on living organ donation by minors should be avoided.
Clinical need for living donation by minors
Considering that living donation by minors may be ethically acceptable under excep-
tional circumstances, it is important to review its historical evolution and assess its
current clinical need. The use of minors as living donors dates back to the early days
of transplantation, when the survival of pediatric patients in need of a transplant
depended upon the availability of a very close genetic match, ideally an identical
twin.13
Due to considerations of urgency, the absence of alternatives and a positive risk–
benefit balance for the minor donor, donation of bone marrow and hematopoietic stem
cells by minors, especially to their siblings, became a relatively common procedure that
is now performed worldwide. In this respect, it should be noted that the severity and
rapid progression of diseases for which the transplantation of bone marrow or hemato-
poietic stem cells may be the only promising treatment frequently leave only a small
window of opportunity to find a suitable donor.14 To reduce the likelihood that the
transplant fails or the recipient develops severe complications such as graft-versus-
host disease, close donor matches are essential. Since family members, and in particular
siblings, offer the best chance of a match, minor siblings may often emerge as the
preferred donors for children in need of transplantation.15 Given that donation does not
entail more than minimal risk and, at the same time, will give the minor the opportunity
to save the life of a sibling, the procedure is considered to be overall beneficial to the
minor donor.
By contrast, through a combination of factors, the number of minors becoming living
kidney donors dramatically declined over time. The discovery of immunosuppressant
drugs reduced the need for a close genetic match, allowing the transplantation from
deceased donors, parents, and other adult relatives. In addition, the advent of substitute
treatments such as peritoneal dialysis and hemodialysis allowed potential minor donors
12. See, M. Navarro-Michel, ‘Institutional Organisation and Transplanting the Spanish Model’,
in A.-M. Farrell, D. Price and M. Quigley, eds., Organ Shortage: Ethics, Law and
Pragmatism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 151–170, where the
case is mistakenly described as involving living kidney donation by a girl named Rocı´o.
13. N. Fost, ‘Children as Renal Donors’, New England Journal of Medicine 296(7) (1977),
pp. 363–367; N.L. Tilney, ‘Renal Transplantation Between Identical Twins: A Review’,
World Journal of Surgery 10(3) (1986), pp. 381–388.
14. F. Frassoni, M. Lapobin, R. Powles, et al., ‘Effect of Centre on Outcome of Bone-
marrow Transplantation for Acute Myeloid Leukaemia’, The Lancet 355(9213) (2000),
pp. 1393–1398.
15. R.S. Negrin, ‘Donor Selection for Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation’ (2015). Available at:
http://www.uptodate.com/contents/donor-selection-for-hematopoietic-cell-transplantation
(accessed 17 June 2016).
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to mature into adulthood before being solicited.16 Finally, the recent establishment of
policies prioritizing pediatric patients in the allocation of kidneys from deceased donors
made it even less likely that a minor would be called upon to become a donor.17
Nevertheless, a situation may arise where donation by a minor is the option of last
resort to save the life of a sibling suffering from end-stage kidney failure. For instance,
transplantation may become urgent when the patient is doing poorly on dialysis or severe
developmental problems occur due to increased duration of renal insufficiency.18
Despite pediatric priority on the waiting list, a deceased donor organ may not become
available in time, especially taking into consideration requirements of organ size and
relatively low donation rates by deceased minors.19 Moreover, living kidney donation by
parents or other adult relatives may prove to be impossible because of unfavorable organ
size, medical conditions, or immunological incompatibility. In particular when the minor
patient has a highly sensitized immune system, an excellent immunological match will
be required, which siblings offer the best chance.20
For the same reasons, a minor might be the only suitable liver donor for a sibling,
especially when that person suffers from acute liver failure. Compared to kidney trans-
plantation, the transplantation of a liver lobe or segment is frequently more urgent
because of much higher waiting list mortality rates and the absence of a meaningful
substitute treatment.21 If no suitable graft from a deceased donor becomes available,
patients may turn to living donation as a lifesaving procedure. However, despite the
possibility of reduced-size liver transplantation, many potential living adult donors who
step forward will be ruled out because of medical contraindications or histoincompat-
ibility.22 Occasionally, a minor sibling might be the best or even the only match to an
ailing brother or sister in need of a liver transplant.
As compared to living donation of bone marrow and hematopoietic stem cells by
minors, the number of living kidney and liver donations by minors is very small. For
instance, data for the United States indicate that since 1987 a total of 66 minors have
donated a kidney. However, for reasons outlined above, these numbers are decreasing,
16. S.D. Marks, ‘Editorial: Should Children Ever Be Living Kidney Donors?’, Pediatric
Transplantation 10(7) (2006), pp. 757–759.
17. M.E. Olbrisch, J.L. Levenson and J.D. Newman, ‘Children as Living Organ Donors: Current
Views and Practice in the United States’, Current Opinion in Organ Transplantation 15(2)
(2010), pp. 241–244.
18. P.F. Hoyer, ‘‘‘Tie Breaker’’ for HLA Matching in Pediatric Renal Transplant Recipients?’,
American Journal of Transplantation 8(10) (2008), pp. 1790–1791.
19. J. Brierly and V. Larcher, ‘Organ Donation from Children: Time for Legal, Ethical and
Cultural Change’, Acta Paediatrica 100(9) (2011), pp. 1175–1179.
20. Each sibling has a 25% chance of being a complete Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) match
to a brother or sister.
21. P. Dutkowski, O. De Rougemont, B. Mu¨llhaupt, et al., ‘Current and Future Trends in Liver
Transplantation in Europe’, Gastroenterology 138(3) (2010), pp. 802–809.
22. J.F. Trotter, M. Wachs, G.T. Everson, et al, ‘Adult-to-adult Transplantation of the Right
Hepatic Lobe from a Living Donor’, New England Journal of Medicine 346(14) (2002),
pp. 1074–1082.
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with only 6 living kidney donations by minors having been performed since 2000.
Additionally, in the United States, 20 minors have donated a liver lobe or segment since
1987.23 Cases of living kidney or liver donation by minors have also been recorded in a
number of other non-European countries, including Brazil, Canada, Japan, and South
Korea.24 By contrast, in Europe these types of donation seem to be largely absent. Only
three cases of living kidney donation by minors have been reported, all involving ado-
lescents and occurring in the United Kingdom before 2006.25 In addition, as has been
highlighted above, one case of living liver donation has been reported in Spain in 2007.
In what follows, we will investigate whether these differences in clinical practice can
be explained by diverging legal approaches and whether there is room to improve the
way in which living tissue and organ donation by minors is currently regulated across
Europe. In order to do so, we will first look at the guidance offered in international legal
instruments and professional guidelines. Subsequently, we will analyze the legal situa-
tion in the United States. Finally, we will examine in detail the legal situation in Europe
and compare it with the legal approach favored in the United States. By virtue of its
unprecedented comparative scope and critical perspective, this study will be an essential
contribution to the scholarly debate.
Guidance offered in international legal instruments
and guidelines
International legal instruments and guidelines do not offer much guidance to address
the issues raised by living tissue and organ donation by minors. In this regard, it
should be pointed out that international standards for the protection of minors do not
explicitly oppose these medical procedures. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989 states that, in all
actions affecting children,26 their best interests must be a primary consideration and
23. For the number of living kidney donations by minors we combined the data for the period
1987 until 2000 as provided in F.L. Delmonico and W.E. Harmon, ‘The Use of a Minor as a
Live Kidney Donor’, American Journal of Transplantation 2(4) (2002), pp. 333–336, with
the data for the period 2001 until 2015 provided by the US Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network. Available at: http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/latestData/
viewDataReports.asp (accessed 17 June 2016). For the number of living liver lobe or
segment donations by minors we completely relied on the data provided by the US Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network.
24. N. Honda, S. Awata and H. Matsuoka, ‘The Case of a Living Liver Donor Who Was
Underage: Psychiatric Issues and Evaluation’ [in Japanese], Seishin Shinkeigaku Zasshi
111(8) (2009), pp. 930–937; A.C. Tannuri, N.E. Gibelli, L.R. Ricardi, et al., ‘Living
Related Donor Liver Transplantation in Children’, Transplantation Proceedings 43(1)
(2011), pp. 161–164.
25. N.J.A. Webb and P.M. Fortune, ‘Should Children Ever Be Living Kidney Donors?’,
Pediatric Transplantation 10(7) (2006), pp. 851–855.
26. A ‘‘child’’ is defined as a person under the age of 18 years, unless under domestic law
majority is attained earlier.
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that their views, when they are capable of forming them, should be given due weight
in accordance with their age and maturity.27 In line with these general rules minors
could be considered as living donors if this would be in their best interests and their
assent is sought.
In the wake of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child protective
standards for minors were developed in several legal instruments issued by European
intergovernmental bodies. At the level of the European Union (EU), the principle that in
all actions relating to minors, their best interests must be a primary consideration and
their views must be taken into consideration in accordance with their age and maturity, is
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed by
the European Parliament in 2000 but entered into force only in 2009.28 Similar provi-
sions can be found in legal instruments adopted by the Council of Europe.29
These general principles do not offer much guidance as to whether, and if so how,
living donation by minors could be allowed, but both the EU and the Council of Europe
have also adopted binding legal instruments in the domain of transplantation. At the level
of the EU, the most important legal instruments addressing organ and tissue donation are
Directive 2004/23/EC and Directive 2010/53/EU. However, because their primary
objective is to establish a framework for the quality and safety of organs, tissues, and
cells, provisions relevant to donation by minors are very general, leaving it to the
member states to decide whether minors should be allowed to donate tissues and/or
organs.30
By contrast, the Council of Europe offers specific guidance on the topic of living
donation by minors. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, adopted in
27. United Nations. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Articles 3 and 12. Available
at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx (accessed 17 June 2016).
Both principles are reiterated in other United Nations instruments, such as the World
Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children, the Vienna
Declaration, and the A World Fit for Children Declaration.
28. European Union (EU). Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/2009),
Article 24. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri¼OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:en:PDF (accessed 17 June 2016).
29. Within the framework of the Council of Europe, the rights of minors in proceedings before a
judicial authority are laid down in the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s
Rights, adopted in 1996, their general social rights are elaborated in the European Social
Charter, adopted in 1961 and revised in 1996, and their rights to participate in decision-
making in all matters affecting them are spelled out in the (nonbinding) Recommendation
CM/Rec(2012)2 on the Participation of Children and Young People under the Age of 18,
adopted in 2012.
30. Directive 2004/23/EC on Setting Standards of Quality and Safety for the Donation,
Procurement, Testing, Processing, Preservation, Storage and Distribution of Human
Tissues and Dells (2004), Article 13. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/ALL/?uri¼CELEX:32004L0023 (accessed 17 June 2016); Directive 2010/53/EU on
Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for Transplantation (2010),
Article 14. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri¼
CELEX:32010L0053 (accessed 17 June 2016).
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1997, and its Additional Protocol on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human
Origin, adopted in 2002, contain detailed provisions on living organ and tissue procure-
ment from minors.31 Emphasizing that a medical intervention on persons who do not
have the capacity to consent is only allowed if it is to their direct benefit, both instru-
ments prohibit them from being considered as living organ or tissue donors. However,
exceptionally and under the protective conditions prescribed by domestic law, the Con-
vention and its Protocol permit procurement of regenerative tissue, provided that several
conditions are met: (1) no compatible donor is available who has the capacity to consent,
(2) the recipient is a sibling of the donor, (3) the donation has the potential to be life-
saving, (4) the representative or authority, person, or body provided for by law has given
free and informed, specific and written authorization, in accordance with domestic law
and approved by a competent body,32 and (5) the potential donor does not object.
In addition, it is specified that the opinion of minors, who do not have the capacity to
consent, has to be taken into consideration as an increasingly determining factor in
proportion to their age and degree of maturity, and that the authorization provided on
behalf of the minor may be withdrawn at any time in the best interests of that person.
This implies that, as set out in the international standards for the protection of minors, the
best interests of the minors must be a primary consideration when deciding whether or
not to authorize tissue removal. Since the capacity to consent is defined by domestic law,
the prohibition of living organ donation and the restrictions concerning living tissue
donation do not apply to minors who, from a certain age onward, are under their
domestic law accorded the capacity to consent to living tissue and/or organ donation.33
Compared to the legal instruments enacted by the Council of Europe, international
guidelines on living organ and tissue donation only contain general recommendations.
For instance, the Guiding Principles on Human Tissue, Cell, and Organ Transplantation,
endorsed by the World Health Assembly in 1991 and last revised in 2010, stipulates that
no cells, tissues, or organs should be removed from the body of a living minor for the
purpose of transplantation but that narrow exceptions may still be allowed under domes-
tic law. More specifically, the Guiding Principles hint at the possibility of donation of
regenerative tissue to a family member when no adult donor is available and to kidney
transplants between identical twins. It is further required that, where domestic legislation
would indeed allow living donation by a minor, specific protective measures should
31. Council of Europe. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), Article 6, para. 1,
and Article 20, paras. 1 and 2. Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/164.htm (accessed 17 June 2016); Council of Europe. Additional Protocol concerning
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (2002), Article 14. Available at:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/186.htm (accessed 17 June 2016).
32. The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine clarifies, in
para. 129, that such a body might be a court, a professionally qualified body, an ethics
committee, and so on. The Explanatory Report is available at: http://conventions.coe.int/
treaty/en/Reports/Html/164.htm (accessed 17 June 2016).
33. See Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol concerning Transplantation of Organs and
Tissues of Human Origin, Addendum. Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
Reports/Html/186.htm (accessed 17 June 2016).
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be put in place and, wherever possible, the assent of the minor should be obtained
before donation.34
The Statement on Human Organ Donation and Transplantation, adopted by the World
Medical Association in 2000 and revised in 2006, similarly states that minors should not
be considered as potential living donors, except in extraordinary circumstances and in
accordance with established protocols or ethical review.35 In its 2012 Statement on
Organ and Tissue Donation, the World Medical Association reaffirmed the principle
that persons who are unable to consent should not be considered as living organ donors,
because they lack the capacity to understand and decide voluntarily. However, excep-
tions may be allowed in very limited circumstances and following legal and ethical
review.36
By contrast, the Consensus Statement of the Amsterdam Forum on the Care of the
Live Kidney Donor, issued by the ethics committee of the Transplantation Society in
2004, emphasizes that minors should not be used as living kidney donors.37 However, in
its 2006 Ethics Statement of the Vancouver Forum on the Live Lung, Liver, Pancreas,
and Intestine Donor, the same committee indicated that persons who are legally incom-
petent could in rare instances still be considered as living lung, liver, pancreas, or
intestine donors, recommending that in such case an independent donor advocate should
be appointed.38
The legal situation in the United States
In the United States, the legal approach toward living tissue and organ donation by
minors was already codified prior to the adoption of relevant international legal
34. World Health Organization. Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ
Transplantation (1991/2010), Guiding Principle 4. Available at: http://www.who.int/
transplantation/Guiding_PrinciplesTransplantation_WHA63.22en.pdf (accessed 17 June
2016).
35. World Medical Association. WMA Statement on Human Organ Donation and
Transplantation (2006). Available at: http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/t7
(accessed 17 June 2016).
36. World Medical Association. WMA Statement on Organ and Tissue Donation (2012).
Available at: http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/o3/ (accessed 17 June
2016).
37. The Ethics Committee of the Transplantation Society, ‘The Consensus Statement of the
Amsterdam Forum on the Care of the Live Kidney Donor’, Transplantation 78(4) (2004),
pp. 491–492.
38. The Ethics Committee of the Transplantation Society, ‘The Ethics Statement of the
Vancouver Forum on the Live Lung, Liver, Pancreas, and Intestine Donor’,
Transplantation 81(10) (2006), pp. 1386–1387. For a systematic review of additional
guidelines and recommendations of national and international expert committees and
organizations on living kidney donation by minors, see K. Thys, K. Van Assche, H.
Nobile, et al. ‘Could Minors Be Living Kidney Donors? A Systematic Review of
Guidelines, Position Papers and Reports’, Transplant International 26(10) (2013),
pp. 949–960.
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instruments and guidelines. In the absence of statutory provisions, courts have been
sporadically petitioned to authorize living donation by persons unable to consent, such
as minors and mentally incompetent adults. In their attempt to balance the interests at
stake, courts relied on two decisional standards. Under the doctrine of ‘‘substituted
judgment,’’ the judges imagine themselves in the position of the minor in order to decide
whether that person would consent to living donation if legally competent. By contrast,
under the ‘‘best interests of the child’’ doctrine, the focus is on whether the benefits that
will likely accrue to the prospective minor donor would exceed the potential risks
involved.
The substituted judgment doctrine was first articulated in 1969 in the groundbreaking
case of Strunk v. Strunk. In this case, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky authorized the
removal of a kidney from mentally incompetent Jerry Strunk, who had a ‘mental age of a
6-year-old’, for the benefit of his older brother Tommy.39 The Court extended the
application of the substituted judgment doctrine, which was the standard for guardians’
decision-making in matters relating to the estate of their wards, to also substantiate the
right to act for ‘incompetents’ in all matters touching on their well-being. More pre-
cisely, it was argued that the substituted judgment doctrine would in this case warrant
kidney removal because this surgical intervention seemed to be in line with the desires
and values of Jerry, who identified very strongly with Tommy, who was his role model
and one of only a few people able to understand his speech. In 1972, the Superior Court
of Connecticut followed the same line of reasoning in Hart v. Brown, when it allowed
kidney donation by 7-year-old Margaret Hart to her identical twin Kathleen.40 The Court
recognized that Margaret had a strong identification with her twin sister and had repeat-
edly expressed the desire to donate a kidney so that Kathleen could return home. How-
ever, the substituted judgment approach has been deemed inappropriate when applied to
such cases since the prospective donors have never been competent and sometimes might
not even have the capacity to voice their preferences. Consequently, the doctrine has
been disqualified as a legal fiction that allows the biases of the substitute decision maker
to influence the decision.41
In the light of this criticism, it comes as no surprise that in most of the subsequent
cases the courts refrained from applying the substituted judgment doctrine and instead
relied on the best interests doctrine.42 In this respect, it should be noted that Strunk v.
39. Strunk v. Strunk, 445S.W. 2d 145 (Ky Ct App 1969).
40. Hart v. Brown, A. 2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
41. T.G. Gutheil and P.S. Appelbaum, ‘Substituted Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise’,
Hastings Center Report 13(3) (1983), pp. 8–11; L.E. Lebit, ‘Compelled Medical
Procedures Involving Minors and Incompetents and Misapplication of the Substituted
Judgment Doctrine’, Journal of Law and Health 7(1) (1992), pp. 107–130; J.A.
Robertson, ‘Organ Donation by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine’,
Columbia Law Review 76(1) (1976), pp. 48–78.
42. However, note that in Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87 (Mass. Eq. July 3, 1974) (authorization
of bone marrow donation by a 6-year-old girl to her brother), the Court explicitly rejected the
substituted judgment and best interests standards and instead recognized the primary right of
the parents for deciding the question.
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Strunk and Hart v. Brown already incorporated an analysis of beneficence in their
application of the substituted judgment standard by making the prevention of the neg-
ative effects of the intended recipient’s death on the prospective donor their primary aim.
However, by applying the best interests doctrine, courts would more objectively focus on
the welfare of the minor or mentally incompetent adult.43 On several occasions, courts
declined a request to permit organ removal whenever donation would not serve any
interests of the prospective donor or whenever the benefits of donation were too spec-
ulative.44 These cases culminated in the landmark decision of Little v. Little, a case from
1979 where the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas authorized kidney donation by 14-year-
old Anne Little, suffering from Down’s syndrome, to her brother Stephen, on the basis of
a best interests test encompassing a wide variety of factors that could influence the
general well-being of the minor.
The Court pointed out that Anne and Stephen had a close relationship and a genuine
concern for each other’s welfare and that Anne would suffer greatly from the death of her
brother. It was also established that donation by Anne was Stephen’s only hope of
survival, since there were no medically preferable alternatives to a kidney transplant,
the chances of obtaining a suitable cadaveric organ were very remote and none of the
adult relatives was medically acceptable as a living donor. In addition, the risks of the
operation were deemed to be only minimal and there was no evidence that Anne would
suffer psychological harm from the procedure. Moreover, the sacrifice that Anne would
make would not be in vain because Stephen would probably benefit substantially from
43. See Howard v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1973) (kidney
donation by a 15-year-old moderately mentally retarded girl to her mother). Several other
cases that were not published but have been reported in the literature followed broadly the
same approach. See, for instance, Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass. Eq. June 12, 1957)
(authorization of kidney donation by a 19-year-old minor to his twin brother); Huskey v.
Harrison, No. 68666 (Mass. Eq. Aug. 30, 1957) (authorization of kidney donation by a
14-year-old girl to her twin sister); Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 (Mass. Eq. Nov. 20,
1957) (authorization of kidney donation by a 14-year-old boy to his twin brother) and
other cases discussed in C.H. Baron, M. Botsford and G.F. Cole, ‘Live Organ and Tissue
Transplants’, Boston University Law Review 55(2), pp. 159–193; W.J. Curran, ‘A Problem of
Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors’, New York University Law Review 34 (1959),
pp. 891–898; A. Garwood-Gowers, Living Donor Organ Transplantation: Key Legal and
Ethical Issues (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 122.
44. In In re Richardson, a case from 1973, the assertion that the intended recipient might well
become the primary caretaker of the prospective donor, who was a mentally incompetent
minor, was brushed aside as speculative by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana. Similarly, in
In re guardianship of Pescinski, a case from 1975, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin declined
a request to authorize kidney removal from a mentally incompetent adult for the benefit of his
sister because it was of the impression that his family wanted to take advantage of him. See In
re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La Ct App 1973); In re guardianship of Pescinski, 226N.W. 2d
180 (Wis Sup Ct 1975). In the much more recent case ofCurran v. Bosze, the Supreme Court of
Illinois denied bone marrow transplant compatibility testing on two 3-year-old twins in the
absence of a close relationship with the intended recipient, their half brother whom they had
only met twice. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E. 2d 1319 (Ill Sup Ct 1990).
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the transplant. Finally, Anne’s parents consented to the organ donation and it was
ascertained that Anne, who was aware of the nature of her brother’s plight and of the
fact that she was in a position to ameliorate his burden, had on several occasions
spontaneously stated her willingness to donate.
Given the presence of all these factors, the Court was persuaded that the benefits that
Anne would gain from kidney donation would far exceed the risks. Interestingly, in its
assessment of the psychological benefits to Anne, the Court did not only consider the
severe negative psychological and social effects on Anne that could be averted by
allowing her to donate. The Court was of the opinion that, apart from preventing these
detrimental effects, donation would also significantly increase Anne’s personal welfare.
In this respect, the Court referred to studies of kidney donors that had revealed ‘‘resulting
positive benefits such as heightened self-esteem, enhanced status in the family, renewed
meaning in life, and other positive feelings including transcendental or peak experi-
ences.’’45 Importantly, the wishes of little Anne and the relation-based benefits that she
would likely receive if she could save Stephen’s life, were used as important elements of
the best interests test. By paying sufficient attention to the emerging preferences and
altruistic tendencies of minors, the Court succeeded in incorporating one of the central
tenets of the substituted judgment doctrine in its application of the best interests stan-
dards. This more hybrid approach was followed by other courts that were petitioned
to authorize bone marrow, skin, or kidney donation by minors and mentally
incompetent adults.46
Little v. Little and subsequent rulings prompted the American Academy of Pediatrics
in 2008 and 2010 to issue guidelines allowing transplant centers to assess the legal
acceptability of living donation by minors without having to resort to court review.
Building on earlier guidance from the American Medical Association and the US Live
Organ Donor Consensus Group47 and in line with the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the international guidelines that had been issued in the meantime, it
45. Little v. Little, 576 S.W. 2d 499 (Tex Ct App 1979).
46. Cf. Hurdle v. Currier, 5 Va. Cir.509 (Va Cir 1977) (authorization of bone marrow donation
by a 16-year-old girl to her sister); Matter of John Doe, 481N.Y.S.2d 932 (App Div 1984)
(authorization of bone marrow donation by a mentally incompetent man to his brother);
Cayouette v. Mathieu, RJQ 2230 (Sup. Ct., 1987) (authorization of bone marrow donation by
a 5-year-old boy to his brother); In re S.C., Nos. 180564 & 180565 (Ala. Prob. Ct. Jan. 6,
2003) (authorization of skin donation by a 6-year-old girl to her twin sister).
47. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, ‘Report 3 – I-
93. The Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue Donors’ (1993). Available at: http://ama-assn.
org/resources/doc/ethics/ceja_3i93.pdf (accessed 17 June 2016). This report was replaced by
‘Report 5 – A-05. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association, ‘Report 5 – A-05. Transplantation of Organs from Living Donors’ (2005).
Available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/x-pub/215a.pdf
(accessed 17 June 2016); Live Organ Donor Consensus Group, ‘Consensus Statement on
the Live Organ Donor’, Journal of the American Medical Association 284(22) (2000),
pp. 2919–2926.
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recommended that minors should only serve as living tissue or organ donors when this
would be in their best interests, by requiring the fulfillment of several criteria.
First, the minor should be the donor of last resort. This requires that all other oppor-
tunities for transplantation should have been exhausted, no potential adult living donor is
available, and, where organ donation is considered, timely and/or effective transplanta-
tion from a cadaver donor is unlikely. Second, transplantation should have a reasonable
probability of success and should provide substantial benefit to the recipient. Third, the
clinical, emotional, and psychosocial risks to the donor should be minimized and deemed
reasonable in relation to the benefits expected to accrue to the donor and to the recipient.
In this regard, it is suggested that the risks involved in living donation of a right liver lobe,
a lung, or small bowel are currently too high to permit minors to donate these organs.
Fourth, a degree of emotional intimacy should exist between the donor and the recipient
that can justify the risks from the perspective of the minor donor. This implies that
donations should be restricted to close family members, where the future psychological
or emotional benefit to the minor donor is likely to be significant. The fifth and final
condition is that parental permission and, where possible, the free and informed assent of
the minor should be obtained. A donor advocacy team should be established that helps the
donor understand the medical procedure, promotes his or her interests, and addresses
potential conflicts of interests on the part of the transplant team and the parents.48
As indicated above, on the basis of the aforementioned court rulings and the resulting
professional guidelines, donation of bone marrow and hematopoietic stem cells by minors
has become a routine procedure in the United States and living kidney and liver donations
by minors have become a clinical reality. Within this well-established regulatory frame-
work, a remaining point of contention concerns whether mature minors could under certain
circumstances be considered capable of deciding for themselves whether to be a living
tissue or organ donor. This possibility, advocated by the American Medical Association,
was not explicitly endorsed in the guidelines of the American Academy of Pediatrics. In
any case, in all court cases involving adolescents living donation was only authorized after
the consent of the parents had been obtained. Interestingly, the issue of living donation by
mature minors prompted three US states to enact legislation to supplement the framework
developed by the aforementioned professional guidelines. As a result, in the state of
Michigan, a minor 14 years or older may give effective consent to donate a kidney to a
close family member with prior authorization by the court, in the state of Alabama a minor
14 years or older may give consent to bone marrow donation, and in the state of Wisconsin a
minor 12 years or older may give consent to bone marrow donation to a sibling if a
psychiatrist or psychologist has determined that the minor is capable of consenting.49
48. L.F. Ross, J.R. Thistlethwaite and the Committee on Bioethics, ‘Minors as Living Solid-
organ Donors’, Pediatrics 122(2) (2008), pp. 454–461; American Academy of Pediatrics,
‘Policy Statement – Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors’, Pediatrics 125(2) (2010),
pp. 392–404.
49. Michigan: MI Comp L § 700.5105 (2015); Alabama: ALA Code § 22-8-9 (2012); WIS
Stat Ann § 146.34 (2012). See also D.L. Coleman, ‘Testing the Boundaries of Family
Privacy: The Special Case of Pediatric Sibling Transplants’, Cardozo Law Review 35
(2014), pp. 1289–1358.
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The legal situation in Europe
As compared to the United States, living tissue and organ donation by minors is regulated
in very heterogeneous ways in Europe. The focus of our analysis is on the 28 EU member
states,50 Norway and Switzerland.51 Since, with very few exceptions, no official English
translations of national transplant regulations exist,52 we compiled national transplant
regulations by consulting the websites of the relevant governmental agencies and trans-
lated and analyzed them with the help of legal experts in the countries under study.
Before proceeding to their analysis, it should be noted that several elements may
account for differences in the national regulations under consideration. Even apart
from the observation that at the national level living donation of tissues and organs
may be governed by a wide variety of statutory and nonstatutory instruments,53 the
50. Currently, the EU comprises 28 member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and, at the time of writing, the United Kingdom.
51. The study was extended so as to include Norway and Switzerland since both countries closely
collaborate with EU member states in the field of transplantation.
52. Note that the Global Database on Donation and Transplantation, established by the World
Health Organization and maintained by the Global Observatory on Donation and
Transplantation, does not contain a translation of domestic transplant regulations. The
database can be accessed at http://www.transplant-observatory.org/Pages/home.aspx
(accessed 17 June 2016). However, for several countries that have enacted transplant
regulations prior to 1994, such as Norway, official translations can be found in World Health
Organization. Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1994). At the level of the Council of Europe and the EU, no translations of transplant
regulations of member states are collected. However, transplant regulations of EU member
states were screened as part of the project on Living Organ Donation in Europe (EULOD),
funded by the European Commission and resulting in L. Lopp, Regulations Regarding Living
Organ Donation in Europe: Possibilities of Harmonisation (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013). In
addition to verification by national legal experts in the countries under consideration, we also
verified our analyses by consulting the academic literature that to some extent contains a
comparison of transplant regulations, such as Lopp, ‘Regulations Regarding Living Donor
Organ Transplantation’, and D. Price, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) while taking account of possible amendments
of transplant regulations having occurred since.
53. Living donation is typically regulated by parliamentary acts which are supplemented by
executive degrees. Frequently, additional guidance is offered by codes of practice or
ethical guidelines issued by national health or transplant authorities, professional
associations, or ethics committees. In Ireland and Malta, no legal instruments setting out
the requirements for living donation have currently been adopted, whereas in Austria living
tissue donation currently is not covered in a transplant act. In all other countries under
consideration, the requirements for living donation are regulated in a legal instrument,
either in the Health Code (e.g., Denmark and France), one Transplant Act (e.g., Germany
and the Netherlands) or two acts dealing separately with tissue and organ transplantation (e.g.
, Belgium and Spain).
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analysis of the domestic regulatory framework is complicated by the uneven ratifica-
tion of the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and its
Additional Protocol on Transplantation. To this day, the Convention has been ratified
by 29 Council of Europe member states, including 17 EU member states, Norway, and
Switzerland.54 Only 14 of the aforementioned Council of Europe member states have
also ratified the Additional Protocol. These include eight member states of the EU and
Switzerland.55
In ratifying countries, the provisions of the Convention and, the case being, those of
the Additional Protocol are directly applicable and to be given effect as national regu-
lation.56 However, the direct applicability of the requirements for living tissue and organ
donation by minors do not need to imply that these exact conditions will apply in
ratifying states. Indeed, citizens may always be granted a wider measure of protection,
for instance, by simply prohibiting certain types of living donation by minors. In addi-
tion, ratifying states can make a reservation in respect of a particular provision to the
extent that legislation in force in its territory is not in conformity.57 As will be discussed,
several ratifying states have indeed submitted a reservation that under their legislation
tissue donation by persons unable to consent will not be restricted to donation to siblings.
European countries that allow minors to donate tissue
but not organs
With the exception of Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, living organ donation by minors is prohibited in all countries under consid-
eration. By contrast, living tissue donation by minors is allowed in all of them. Where the
requirements for living donation are regulated in a legal instrument, provisions specify
that minors may be considered as potential donors of bone marrow or hematopoietic
stem cells. In Ireland, pending the adoption of the Human Tissue Bill, this possibility is
provided by ethical guidelines. By contrast, in countries where no legal framework or
ethical guidelines for tissue donation currently exist, such as Austria and Malta, the
situation is more uncertain. According to legal doctrine, tissue donation by minors will
likely be allowed under the general principles on the protection of minors, as long as it
54. EU member states that have ratified the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine are
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. See http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT¼164&CM¼8&DF¼18/02/
2012&CL¼ENG (accessed 17 June 2016).
55. EU member states that have ratified the Additional Protocol on Transplantation are Bulgaria,
Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain. See http://conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT¼186&CM¼8&DF¼18/02/2012&CL¼ENG
(accessed 17 June 2016).
56. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Article 1 and its Explanatory Report, para.
20.
57. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Article 36.
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can be presumed that it will be in the minor donor’s best interests to save the life of the
recipient.58
Countries where minors are not allowed to donate an organ have in large majority
ratified the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.59 Most of these ratifying
states have amended their transplant regulation to be in line with the Convention. In
ratifying states that failed to amend their transplant law accordingly, such as Denmark
and Latvia, the requirements set out in the Convention will still be applicable due to their
self-executing nature.60 Interestingly, even in those nonratifying states where minors are
only allowed to donate tissue, the restrictions imposed by the Convention seem to be
largely respected. In Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, the transplant law
closely resembles the provisions of the Convention in this regard.
In sum, in countries where minors are only allowed to donate tissue, requirements are
very similar and in conformity with the conditions set out in the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine and reiterated in its Additional Protocol concerning Transplan-
tation. In these countries, living tissue donation by minors will only be allowed if, in
addition to the requirements applicable to living tissue donation by adults, five protective
conditions are fulfilled.
First, minors may only be considered as living tissue donors in the absence of a
compatible donor who is able to consent. As clarified in the Explanatory Memorandum
to the Convention, this implies that ‘‘within reasonable limits’’ efforts need to be under-
taken to find a competent compatible donor.61 In the same vein, the French transplant
regulation specifies that every effort should first have been made to find an adult donor
who is sufficiently compatible.
Second, the envisaged donation must have the potential to save the life of the intended
recipient. This condition is dictated by the consideration that a reasonable benefit–risk
ratio should be guaranteed since, unlike competent donors, minors do not have the capacity
to autonomously decide what benefit–risk balance would be acceptable. In practice, this
means that living tissue donation by a minor may only be considered as a therapy of last
resort for a person who is in mortal danger. Furthermore, the health risks to the donor
should be reasonable. Although this condition also holds for competent donors, the
58. In this regard, see for Austrian legal doctrine: G. Aigner, ‘Einwilligung Minderja¨hriger in
eine Knochenmarkspende’, Recht der Medizin (1998), p. 144; A. Kletecka, ‘Einwilligung,’ in
G. Aigner, A. Kletecka, M. Kletecka-Pulker and M. Memmer, eds., Handbuch Medizinrecht
fu¨r die Praxis (Wien: MANZ’sche, 2004–2009), pp. I/131–I/153.
59. Exceptions are Austria, Germany, Italy, Malta, and the Netherlands.
60. In accordance with the constitutional principle of priority of treaty law over domestic law or,
in the absence of such constitutional clause, consistent with national and European
jurisprudence and legal doctrine, provisions with the so-called self-executing character
will have direct effect, over and above those provided for in national law. Provisions are
self-executing when they do not merely impose obligations to the state but also confer
unconditional, clear, and precise rights to citizens. See the Explanatory Report to the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para. 20.
61. Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para. 126.
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Explanatory Memorandum hints that, where minors are considered, the maximum thresh-
old of anticipated risk will have to be considerably lower to be acceptable.62
Third, minors should only be considered to donate tissue when the intended recipient
is a close relative. This restriction is prompted by the concern that the procedure should
be in the minor’s best interest and, consequently, should be to that person’s psycholo-
gical benefit. This requirement is made explicit in the Explanatory Memorandum to the
Additional Protocol, indicating that an exception to the prohibition of tissue removal can
be justified by ‘‘the principle of mutual aid between very close members of a family and
the possibility for psychological benefits to the donor arising from donation.’’63 Accord-
ing to this line of reasoning, minors are allowed to donate only when it can be assumed
that their own interests would be severely compromised by the death of a person whom
they are emotionally intimate with and in a position to save. The Dutch Transplant Law
makes this explicit, by stating that minors who are unable to consent are only allowed to
donate tissue if they have a keen interest in averting the mortal danger of the intended
recipient.
As to the nature of the acceptable relationship between the minor donor and the
recipient, considerable variation exists. In line with the Convention, all countries allow
living tissue donation by a minor for the benefit of a sibling. Some countries that have not
ratified the Convention have broadened the acceptable categories of recipients. For
instance, in Germany and the Netherlands, minors may also donate to a parent or, when
they are parents themselves, to a child. In addition, some ratifying states have submitted
a reservation to the applicable provision of the Convention by stating that under their
national law donation will not be restricted to siblings. For instance, Croatia and Den-
mark also allow living tissue donation by minors when the recipient is a parent, Switzer-
land when the recipient is a parent or child, and France when the recipient is a first
cousin, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece.64 Surprisingly, several ratifying countries that did
not make such a reservation, have also opted to extend the possibility of living tissue
donation to recipients other than siblings, mostly by including parents and children but
sometimes also by including more distant relatives.65 Although donation to parents and
children may possibly be regarded as still in compliance with the spirit of the Conven-
tion, because they are relatives of a closer degree of consanguinity than siblings, allow-
ing donation to more distant relatives will presumably give rise to a conflict of law.
62. Op. cit., para 127.
63. Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol concerning Transplantation of Organs and
Tissues of Human Origin, para. 83.
64. The list of reservations can be consulted at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ListeDeclarations.asp?NT¼164&CM¼8&DF¼27/04/2014&CL¼ENG&VL¼1 (accessed
17 June 2016).
65. In Bulgaria, such donation is allowed also when the recipient is a parent, child, or spouse; in
Cyprus when the recipient is a relative up to the third degree; in Estonia when the recipient is
a descendant, spouse or de facto spouse, parent, grandparent, or their descendant; in Finland
when the recipient is a close family member or other close person; in Lithuania when the
recipient is a parent, a foster parent, or a biological child of a foster parent; and in Romania
when the recipient is a relative up to the fourth degree.
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Fourth, minors are only allowed to donate tissue after all consent or authorization
requirements in force in the country concerned have been met. In some countries minors
above a fixed age limit are presumed to have the capacity to consent to health-care
procedures or, alternatively, they may on a case-by-case basis be considered to be
competent to do so. However, only very few countries have extended this approach to
the context of living tissue donation. For instance, in Denmark and Slovenia the fixed
age limit defined in the Health Act also applies to the transplant law. Consequently,
consent for living tissue donation will need to be obtained from minors above the age of
15. Other countries have established a lower cut-off age for consent. For instance, in
Poland minors aged 13 years and older will have to give their consent before procure-
ment may take place, in Greece and the Netherlands this age limit has been set at 12, and
in Romania even at 10. Alternatively, in some countries a case-to-case assessment of the
maturity of the minor will need to be performed. For instance, in Germany and Switzer-
land, the consent of the minor will need to be obtained if that person is considered able to
recognize the nature, significance, and consequences of the donation and to express his
or her will.
Technically, minors who are able to consent are not subject to the requirements for
living donation by persons unable to consent as laid down in the Convention. However,
the regulations in all of the 24 countries that only allow living tissue donation by minors
make the same conditions applicable to all minors regardless of their ability to consent.
Consequently, the situation of all minors is analogous, more particularly because even in
countries where some minors are deemed competent to consent, they don’t have the
power to autonomously decide to donate. Regardless of the minor’s own competence,
parental authorization will always be required.
In addition to the consent of the competent minor and parental authorization, final
approval by an independent competent body is also mandatory. In some countries, such
as Croatia and Romania, permission has to be obtained from a pluridisciplinary living
donor committee at the level of the transplant hospital.66 In other countries, such as
Estonia and Poland, final decision-making authority is delegated to a judge.67 In still
other countries, including Bulgaria and Portugal, a professional body at the national level
will need to be petitioned.68
Fifth, tissue removal from a minor may not be carried out if that person objects.
Where minors are competent to consent, their refusal to do so will be decisive. Minors
who according to domestic law are not competent to consent should as far as possible be
consulted. They should receive appropriate and tailored information about the nature,
purpose, and consequences of donation and their opinion should be obtained. As indi-
cated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Convention, if they express opposition, in
66. Other countries include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia.
67. Other countries include France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In
Switzerland, it is up to each canton to establish the independent body. The power to grant
final approval has in most cantons been delegated to the civil court, but some cantons have
instead entrusted the Guardianship Supervisory Authority.
68. Other countries include Cyprus, Finland, and Slovenia.
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whatever form, this must be observed.69 In several of the countries under consideration,
transplant regulations do not explicitly state that an objection from a minor who is unable
to consent will preclude living tissue donation. However, as prescribed by international
standards for the protection of minors, their indication of refusal will have to be taken
into consideration as an increasingly determining factor in proportion to their age and
degree of maturity. It will be the task of the independent competent body to assess
whether possible resistance on the part of the person concerned qualifies as an objection
that would rule out tissue procurement.
European countries that allow minors to donate both tissue
and organs
By contrast, living organ donation by a minor is allowed in six European countries only. This
is the case for Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
In what follows the regulations in these countries will be examined more in-depth.
Norway
In Norway, living tissue and organ donation by minors is regulated by the Trans-
plant Law of 1973. A new transplant law is currently being debated but no major
changes to the provisions on the requirements for living donation are envisaged.
The Transplant Law differentiates between minors younger than 12 and minors
who are 12 years and older. Minors who have not yet reached the age of 12 are
only allowed to donate tissue. In line with the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, which has been ratified by Norway, the Transplant Law lists the five
cumulative requirements that need to be fulfilled before living tissue donation by a
minor of that age may be considered.70 However, Norway has submitted a reserva-
tion to the Convention, indicating that tissue donation is allowed not only for the
benefit of a sibling but also for the benefit of a child or a parent or, in special
cases, another close relative of the minor. What would constitute a special case has
to be considered in the light of the closeness of the relationship with the recipient
and the urgency of the procedure.71 The intervention is subject to authorization by
69. Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para. 130.
70. Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 on Transplantation, Hospital Autopsy, Donation of Bodies,
Etc. § 1 [Lov 1973-02-09 nr 06 om transplantasjon, sykehusobduksjon og avgivelse av lik
m.m.]. The official translation can be found in World Health Organization, ‘Legislative
Responses to Organ Transplantation’, pp. 276–278.
71. See the information contained in the report on the draft Norwegian transplant law: ‘When
Death Serves Life. A Proposal for New Legislation on Transplantation, Autopsy and
Donation of Bodies’ (2011): 178 [‘Na˚r døden tjener livet. Et forslag til nye lover om
transplantasjon, obduksjon og avgivelse av lik’]. This report (in Norwegian) is available
at: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/36553050/PDFS/NOU201120110021000DDDPDFS.
pdf (accessed 17 June 2016).
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the County Medical Officer who should decide on the basis of the minor’s
best interests.
Minors 12 years and older are allowed to donate tissues and organs if they are capable
of understanding the nature, significance, and consequences of the donation and consent in
writing.72 By limiting organ donation to minors with the capacity to consent, the Norwe-
gian Transplant Law is still in conformity with the Convention. Consent may only be
granted ‘‘when special circumstances so warrant’’ and requires the approval of the person
with parental custody of the minor and final authorization by the County Medical Officer.
Whether ‘‘special circumstances’’ exist depends on the urgency of the donation, the
closeness of the relationship with the intended recipient and the intrusiveness of the
surgical procedure. As indicated in the preparatory works, the reason to allow organ
donation by mature minors is to permit them to help a close family member where the
interdiction to donate would put them under a severe mental strain.73 The law sets no limits
on who could receive tissues or organs from a mature minor. However, in practice only
donation to recipients who are relatives or close friends would be accepted.74 Nonetheless,
no case of living organ donation by a mature minor has yet been reported in Norway.
Sweden
In Sweden, living tissue and organ donation by minors is regulated by the 1995 Trans-
plant Law.75 Living donation by minors is only allowed if the minor is related to the
intended recipient and if no compatible competent adult donor has been found. Regard-
less of their age or cognitive faculties minors are not considered competent to consent to
living donation. Therefore, such procedure may only be performed on the basis of an
authorization by the parents or guardian and if the minor does not object. In addition, the
Law also requires final approval by the National Board of Health and Welfare, which
may grant permission only if the intervention has been endorsed by the donor’s trans-
plant surgeon. It is not necessary that the envisaged donation has the potential to save the
life of the intended recipient. However, living organ donation should only be approved
‘‘if exceptional reasons make it appropriate.’’76 In this regard, guidelines issued by the
National Board of Health and Welfare clarify that serious danger to the recipient’s life or
health may constitute an exceptional reason.77 Considering that the National Board has
72. Law No. 6 of 9 February 1973 on Transplantation, Hospital Autopsy, Donation of Bodies,
Etc. § 1.
73. ‘When Death Serves Life’ (2011): 96.
74. Op. cit., 100.
75. Law of 8 June 1995 on Transplantation, Etc. [Lag om transplantation m.m. 8 juni 1995]. No
official translation exists but a list of legal requirements can be found in NordForsk.
Legislation on Biotechnology in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: NordForsk, 2015), p. 19.
76. Law of 8 June 1995 on Transplantation, Etc. § 8.
77. SOSFS 2009:30 National Board Regulations on the Donation and Procurement of Organs,
Tissues and Cells, Chapter 6, §§1-2, [SOSFS 2009:30 Socialstyrelsens fo¨reskrifter om
donation och tillvaratagande av organ, va¨vnader och celler]. Available at: http://www.
socialstyrelsen.se/sosfs/2009-30#anchor_5 (accessed 17 June 2016).
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to decide on the basis of the minor’s best interests, it may be presumed that it will only
permit living organ donation as a last resort to save the life of a close relative. Up until
now no case of living organ donation by a minor has been reported.
Belgium
In Belgium, living donation is regulated by the Law on the Removal and Transplantation
of Organs, enacted in 1986. With the adoption of the Biobank Law in 2008, tissue
donation was excluded from the scope of the Transplant Law, although it lasted until
2012 before the latter instrument was amended accordingly. Restricting the scope of the
Transplant Law to the donation of organs had major consequences. Before, the Trans-
plant Law stipulated that living tissue and organ donation by minors was allowed where
this normally could not have severe consequences, involved regenerative tissues and
organs only and would benefit a sibling. From minors 12 years and older prior consent
was needed. Minors who had not yet attained the age of 12 had to be given the oppor-
tunity to express their opinion. Parental authorization and, the case being, consent from
the mature minor, had to be given in writing and in the presence of an adult witness
whose signature was also required. The consent form had to be presented to the trans-
plant surgeon who was only allowed to proceed after a pluridisciplinary committee at the
level of the transplant hospital had given approval.
After the restriction of the scope of the Transplant Law, the provisions on living
donation by minors remain largely the same but now only apply to organs.78 By remov-
ing tissues from the scope of the Law, the possibility for minors to donate regenerative
tissues or organs, which had previously been interpreted as pertaining only to bone
marrow and hematopoietic stem cells, was reinterpreted to only refer to liver segments
or lobes. Parliamentary proceedings demonstrate that Belgian legislators explicitly had
the donation of a liver lobe or segment in mind and were of the opinion that medical
developments in the field indicated that this type of donation entailed risks which had
become sufficiently acceptable to allow donation by minors.79 Admitting that the risks
were not negligible, it was deemed inappropriate to allow minors younger than 12 to
donate a liver lobe or segment.80 Consequently, the requirements for living organ
78. Law on the Procurement and Transplantation of Organs, Article 7 [Wet betreffende het
wegnemen en transplanteren van organen/Loi sur le pre´le`vement et la transplantation
d’organes]. Available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?
language¼nl&la¼N&table_name¼wet&cn¼1986061337 (Dutch) and http://www.ejustice.
just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language¼fr&la¼F&cn¼1986061337&table_name¼loi
(French) (accessed 17 June 2016).
79. See Belgian House of Representatives. Draft Law Amending the Law of 13 June 1986,
Explanatory Memorandum, 19 April 2012, p. 26 [Belgische Kamer van
Volksvertegenwoordigers. Wetsontwerp tot wijziging van de wet van 13 juni 1986,
Memorie van toelichting/Chambre de repre´sentants de Belgique. Expose´ des motifs].
Available at: http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/53/2158/53K2158001.pdf (Dutch and
French) (accessed 17 June 2016).
80. Op. cit., pp. 26–27.
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donation were slightly amended so as to only allow donation by minors 12 years or older
who are capable of expressing their will and have given prior consent. However, it
should be noted that contrary to legislative opinion, Belgian legal doctrine thinks that
the risks involved in liver lobe or segment donation are still too high to allow the involve-
ment of minors.81 Notwithstanding the on-going debate, no case of living donation of a liver
lobe or segment, or for that matter, of any other organ, by a minor has yet been reported
in Belgium.
With the adoption of the Biobank Law in 2008, the conditions for living tissue
donation by minors were considerably relaxed as compared to its regulation under the
Transplant Law.82 Henceforth, it is no longer required that donation would have to
benefit a sibling. In fact, no restriction of acceptable categories of recipients has been
retained, with minors in theory being allowed to donate to total strangers. Similarly,
the consent and authorization procedure was changed drastically. Written consent
needs to be obtained from minors who, in accordance with the Law on Patients’
Rights, are considered capable of a reasonable assessment of their interests. For
incompetent minors parental authorization is required. These forms have to be pre-
sented to the surgeon responsible for the removal of the bone marrow. Moreover,
compared to the previous regulation, consent no longer needs to be given in the
presence of an adult witness whose signature on the consent form is required and
final approval from a pluridisciplinary committee at the level of the transplant hospital
is no longer needed.
Luxembourg
In Luxembourg, organ donation is governed by the Law Regulating the Procurement of
Substances of Human Origin of 1982. According to this Law, living organ donation by
minors is allowed if they are capable of judgment and consent in writing, the organ will
be transplanted into a sibling and authorization is obtained from the parents and a
81. See, for instance, the Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics’s Opinion No. 50 of 9 May
2011 (2011) [‘Advies nr. 50 van 9 mei 2011’/’Avis n 50 du 9 mai 2011’]. Available at:
http://www.health.belgium.be/eportal/Healthcare/Consultativebodies/Commitees/Bioethics/
Opinions/index.htm (accessed 17 June 2016); N. Broeckx, ‘Orgaantransplantatie’, in T.
Vansweevelt and F. Dewallens, eds., Handboek Gezondheidsrecht. Volume II
(Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2014), p. 1185.
82. Law on the Acquisition and Use of Human Biological Material for the Purpose of Medical
Applications to Humans or Scientific Research, Article 10 [Wet inzake het verkrijgen en het
gebruik van menselijk lichaamsmateriaal met het oog op de geneeskundige toepassing op de
mens of het wetenschappelijk onderzoek/Loi relative a` l’obtention et a` l’utilisation
de mate´riel corporel humain destine´ a` des applications me´dicales humaines ou a` des fins
de recherche scientifique]. Available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.
pl?language¼nl&la¼N&table_name¼wet&cn¼2008121944 (Dutch) and http://www.
ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language¼fr&la¼F&cn¼2008121944&table_
name¼loi (French) (accessed 17 June 2016).
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pluridisciplinary committee consisting of at least three experts, including two physi-
cians.83 No case of living organ donation by minors has been reported yet.
Tissue donation is regulated by the Law on Human Tissues and Cells Intended for
Human Applications, adopted in 2007. As compared to living tissue donation by adults,
minors may only be considered if several additional requirements are fulfilled, which are
in line with the approach taken in the Convention: no other therapeutic solution or
compatible adult donor is available, the recipient is a sibling, written parental authoriza-
tion is obtained, the minor does not object, and a pluridisciplinary committee consisting
of at least three experts, including two physicians, has granted approval.84
Ireland
In Ireland, organ and tissue donation is currently not dealt with by legislation.85 Pending
the adoption of the Human Tissue Bill, the requirements for living tissue and organ
donation by minors are spelled out in ethical guidelines drafted for the Irish Living
Donation Program. Both types of donation are subject to the same set of severe restric-
tions. As is the case for living donation by competent adults, donation is only allowed for
the therapeutic benefit of an intended recipient and if no organs or tissues from a
cadaveric donor or therapeutic alternatives of comparable effectiveness are available.
Several additional requirements need to be fulfilled where minors are concerned. For
instance, donation may only proceed if no competent adult donor is available and if
donation would entail only minimal risk and discomfort to the donor and is expected to
be of great benefit to the recipient. With regard to the nature of the relationship between
the donor and the recipient, it is specified that donation is only acceptable for the benefit
of a recipient with whom the minor has an intimate relationship (i.e. a sibling or a
parent). Other criteria focus on the decision-making procedure to be followed. In addi-
tion to parental authorization, the assent or, where competent, the consent of the minor
83. Law of 25 November 1982 Regulating the Removal of Substances of Human Origin, Article
2 [Loi re´glant le pre´le`vement de substances d’origine humaine]. Available at: http://www.
legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/1982/0098/a098.pdf#page¼2 (accessed 17 June 2016). An
overview of the law but no official translation of it can be found in World Health
Organization, ‘Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation’, p. 256.
84. Law on Human Tissues and Cells Intended for Human Applications, Article 8 [Loi relative
aux tissus et cellules humains destine´s a` des applications humaines]. Available at: http://
www.legilux.public.lu/rgl/2007/A/2750/A.html (accessed 17 June 2016).
85. Statutory instruments mainly concern the establishment of a national framework for quality
and safety of human organs and tissues. As a result, they contain few and only general
requirements for living organ and tissue donation. Notwithstanding their general wording,
these provisions already indicate that organ and tissue procurement from a person who is
unable to give consent may be allowed in Ireland. See European Communities (Quality and
Safety of Human Tissues and Cells) Regulations 2006, Regulation 11, para. 3. Available at:
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2006/en/si/0158.html (accessed 17 June 2016); European
Union (Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for Transplantation) Regulations
2012, Regulation 22, para. 1. Available at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2012/en/si/0325.
html (accessed 17 June 2016).
Van Assche et al. 81
 at Universiteit Antwerpen on September 9, 2016mli.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
will need to be obtained and approval by the High Court should be sought. It is further
stipulated that donation may only be authorized when all decision makers involved are
convinced that donation would be in the best interests of the minor.86
Notwithstanding these ethical guidelines, considerable uncertainty currently exists as
to the legal status of mature minors. Similar to corresponding provisions in other Eur-
opean countries, the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 allows minors who
have attained the age of 16 years to consent to surgical, medical, or dental treatment
without requiring parental authorization.87 In contrast to the United Kingdom, the scope
of these provisions has not yet been judicially considered in Ireland. With regard to
intrusive procedures which might not easily be characterized as treatment, such as living
tissue or organ donation, the question arises as to the limits of the mature minor’s
autonomy, especially in the light of the extensive rights that under the Irish Constitution
are awarded to parents.88 Not surprisingly, a cautionary approach is advocated in pro-
fessional guidelines, as reflected in the ethical guidelines mentioned above.89
However, as indicated during the consultation procedure regarding the general
scheme for the future Human Tissue Bill, a few submissions proposed to give due
consideration to the autonomy of the mature minor even in the context of living tissue
and organ donation.90 Consequently, although the initial scheme of the Bill did not
provide for this possibility, the current version differentiates between minors depending
on whether they have attained the age of 16. Minors who are younger than 16 will only
be allowed to donate if the requirements applicable to competent living donors are
fulfilled, there is no compatible donor who has the capacity to consent, the recipient
is a sibling and the donation is potentially lifesaving for the recipient. In addition, the
potential donor’s assent needs to be obtained, as well as authorization from the parents
and the High Court, which should decide on the basis of the best interests standard.
By contrast, minors who have attained the age of 16 will, for the purposes of the
Human Tissue Bill, be considered as adults, in line with the rule on mature minors laid
down in the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. Given the strong consti-
tutional rights of the family in Ireland, the medical staff is advised to petition the High
86. We would like to thank Dr. Sio´bhan O’Sullivan for providing this information.
87. Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, Section 23(1). Available at: http://www.
irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0026/sec0023.html (accessed 17 June 2016).
88. D. Madden, Medicine, Ethics and the Law (Bloomsbury: Haywards Heath, 2011), pp.
513–514.
89. Similarly, the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical
Practitioners, published by the Irish Medical Council in 2009, states that, although minors
aged 16 and over are entitled to give their own consent to treatment, this entitlement does not
apply to areas such as tissue or organ donation. See Irish Medical Council. Guide to
Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical Practitioners, 2009, para. 43.2.
Available at: https://www.medicalcouncil.ie/News-and-Publications/Publications/
Information-for-Doctors/Guide-to-Professional-Conduct-and-Ethics-for-Registered-
Medical-Practitioners.pdf (accessed 17 June 2016).
90. Report on the Public Consultation on Proposals for the General Scheme of the Human Tissue
Bill (2009), p. 5.
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Court when the parents would object to the donation. As of now, no case of organ
donation by a minor has been reported. However, a proposed kidney donation by a
12-year-old girl suffering from Down’s syndrome to her 8-year-old brother was with-
drawn at the last moment when a compatible donor was found.91
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, with the exception of Scotland,92 living organ and tissue dona-
tion is governed by the Human Tissue Act 2004. According to the Act, the removal or use
of ‘‘transplantable material’’ from a living person for the purpose of transplantation is
only allowed when the conditions as specified in the regulations issued by the Secretary
of State are complied with and the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) is satisfied that these
conditions are fulfilled.93 The relevant Regulations are the Human Tissue Act 2004
(Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006, which
define transplantable material as ‘‘an organ or part of an organ if it is to be used for the
same purpose as the entire organ in the human body’’ and, as far as incompetent persons
are concerned, also bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cells.94
91. Communication by Dr. Sio´bhan O’Sullivan.
92. In Scotland, living organ and tissue donation by minors is regulated in the Human Tissue
(Scotland) Act 2006 and the Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland)
Regulations 2006. According to these instruments, removal of tissues is allowed if there is
no competent adult who could act as a donor, the removal involves at most a minimal
foreseeable risk and discomfort, and the person concerned has not indicated an
unwillingness to be a donor. Where these requirements have been fulfilled, the person
concerned needs to be referred to an independent assessor and final decision-making
authority is delegated to the Human Tissue Authority. Removal of an organ from a minor
is allowed only as part of a domino organ transplant operation (i.e. a transplant procedure
during which an organ is removed from the recipient which in turn may prove suitable for
transplantation into another person). Since this form of donation is not regulated by the
Human Tissue Act, the procedure is not subject to approval by the Human Tissue
Authority but is instead covered by the common law. It should be noted that under
Scottish legislation a person becomes an adult when they reach the age of 16. See Human
Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006. Available at: www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2006/
asp_20060004_en_3#pt1-pb3 (accessed 17 June 2016); Human Organ and Tissue Live
Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006. Available at: www.oqps.gov.uk/legislation/ssi/
ssi2006/ssi_20060390_en_1 (accessed 17 June 2016).
93. Human Tissue Act 2004, S. 33. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/30/
pdfs/ukpga_20040030_en.pdf (accessed 17 June 2016). The Human Tissue Authority is an
executive public body of the Department of Health, established to ensure that human tissues
are used safely and ethically. It regulates the organizations involved in the removal, storage,
and use of tissues, approves living organ and bone marrow donation, and issues Codes of
Practice laying down standards for the sectors it regulates. Available at: http://www.hta.gov.
uk/aboutus.cfm (accessed 17 June 2016).
94. Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants)
Regulations 2006, R. 10(1). Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1659/
pdfs/uksi_20061659_en.pdf (accessed 17 June 2016).
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When living donation of such material by an incompetent minor is considered,
the matter should be referred to the HTA by a medical practitioner who has clinical
responsibility for the donor. The Authority’s decision has to be made by a Trans-
plant Approval Team in cases of living bone marrow or hematopoietic stem cell
donation and by a panel of no fewer than three members in case of living donation
of an organ or part of an organ used for the same purpose as an organ. The HTA
must be satisfied that no reward has been given and that the removal is consensual
or otherwise lawful.95 In reaching its decision, the Authority has to take account of a
report submitted by an HTA-approved independent assessor.96 Although the Human
Tissue Act and the Regulations do not contain additional requirements, the HTA has
issued Codes of Practice, recommending that, in accordance with common law and
the Children Act 1989, court approval should be obtained before organ removal and,
if there is any doubt as to best interests of the minor, also before the removal of
bone marrow or hematopoietic stem cells.97 Both Codes emphasize that a court
ruling should be in place before the case is even referred to the Authority.98 The
applicable court will be the Family Division of the High Court or the Court of
Protection, which will have to determine whether donation would be in the best
interests of the minor, by considering the ‘‘welfare checklist’’ set out in the Children
Act 1989.99
When living tissue donation by competent minors is considered, the procedure may
differ considerably, since they are treated as competent adults.100 Living donation of
95. Op. cit., R. 11(2) & (3) and 12(1) & (2).
96. The independent assessor is a professional attached to a hospital transplant unit, with the
responsibility to assess whether the requirements of the Human Tissue Act and Regulations
2006 have been met. The assessor conducts interviews with the donor and the person who
has parental responsibility, ensuring that there is no evidence of duress or coercion and that
parental consent has been given freely and on the basis of complete and intelligible
information. See Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and
Transplants) Regulations 2006, R. 11(6)-(9).
97. Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 2 – Donation of solid organs for transplantation,
para. 47. Available at: http://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/
codesofpractice/code2donationoforgans.cfm (accessed 17 June 2016); Human Tissue
Authority Code of Practice 6 – Donation of allogeneic bone marrow and peripheral
blood stem cells for transplantation, para. 33. Available at: http://www.hta.gov.uk/
legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code6donationofbonemarrow.cfm
(accessed 17 June 2016).
98. Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 2, Appendix A, para. A10; Human Tissue
Authority Code of Practice 6, para. 33.
99. Children Act 1989, S. 1(3). Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/41/
section/1 (accessed 17 June 2016).
100. However, it should be noted that, whereas the consent of competent minors is sufficient for
the living tissue donation to be carried out and whereas the objection of competent minors
categorically rules out their use as living tissue donors, competent minors who do not
express consent nor objection may, in accordance with the Human Tissue Act 2004, S.
2(3)b and the common law doctrine of concurrent rights of consent, still be used as living
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bone marrow or hematopoietic stem cells can be carried out on the basis of the free and
informed consent of the competent minor, without requiring approval of the HTA.
However, the Code of Practice states that it would be good practice to consult the person
with parental responsibility and to involve them in the decision-making of the minor,
although the decision to consent must be the minor’s alone.101
The procedure to be followed for living organ donation by competent minors is
similar to the one involving incompetent minors, with the exception that the consent
of the person concerned will suffice. Although no additional requirements are prescribed
in the statutory instruments, the Code of Practice recommends that involvement of the
person with parental responsibility should be sought and court approval obtained before
proceeding to organ removal from a competent minor.102
The Human Tissue Act itself offers no guidance as to when a minor is to be considered
competent to consent to living tissue or organ donation. In fact, whether minors can be
sufficiently competent to do so is a matter of considerable debate. In this context, it is
important to note that the Family Law Reform Act 1969 gives minors of 16 and 17 years
of age the right to consent to ‘‘any surgical, medical or dental treatment,’’ with their consent
being as effective as that of an adult.103 However, treatment may not cover every medical
procedure and it seems unlikely that tissue or organ donation can be classified as treatment.104
An alternative approach to the maturity of minors in the health care setting has been
developed under common law. In the famous 1986 Gillick case, it was accepted that a
minor who has sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fully what is
proposed can provide legal consent for a medical procedure.105 Since the level of matu-
rity needed will depend on the severity of the issue in question, the applicability of the
concept of Gillick competence may be limited in the context of tissue and organ dona-
tion.106 During the Parliamentary debate of the draft Human Tissue Act and in the
Explanatory Notes to the Act, it was pointed out that the capacity of the minor should
tissue donors on the basis of parental consent or court authorization. We would like to thank
the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
101. Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 6, para. 75. See also D. Price, Human Tissue in
Transplantation and Research: A Model Legal and Ethical Donation Framework
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 31.
102. Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 2, paras. 84–85 & Appendix A, para. A10.
103. Family Law Reform Act 1969, S. 8. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1969/46/pdfs/ukpga_19690046_en.pdf (accessed 17 June 2016).
104. This line of reasoning inspired the Court of Appeal in Re W (A Minor) to state obiter that the
Family Law Reform Act 1969 would not apply to donation because, ‘‘so far as the donor is
concerned, these do not constitute either treatment or diagnosis.’’ See Re W (Minor:
Medical Treatment), 4 All ER 627 (C.A. 1992); Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) 3
WLR 758(C.A. 1992).
105. In this case, the House of Lords followed the claim of the Department of Health and Social
Security that a physician could provide contraceptive advice to a minor without consulting
her parents. See Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, AC 112 (1986).
106. For instance, in the abovementioned case of Re W Lord Donaldson regarded it as highly
improbable that a minor would be considered as being sufficiently competent to be able to
consent to such an intrusive procedure as kidney donation. For a discussion of this
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indeed be determined by reference to the common law.107 Similarly, the Codes of
Practice note that minors who can show that they are Gillick competent may consent
to the proposed donation.108 However, as indicated, the Codes suggest a cautionary
approach by recommending that, regardless of whether a minor would be considered
Gillick competent, court approval should be obtained.
A final point of contention is whether living tissue and organ donation by a minor
could be in that person’s best interests if a case would come before the High Court or the
Court of Protection. Since, according to the welfare checklist of the Children Act 1989,
the court should in particular have regard to the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the
minor concerned, the fact that a minor who is Gillick competent consents to the proce-
dure will weigh heavily in favor of granting approval.109 However, the situation of
persons who are not Gillick competent is more uncertain. It is submitted that the donation
of bone marrow or hematopoietic stem cells can be in the incompetent minor’s best
interest, in particular when it would have the potential to save the life of a sibling or
another close family member.110 However, whether organ donation could ever be in the
best interests of an incompetent minor is less certain.111 Since, as of yet, no cases have
arisen, it is unclear whether circumstances could exist in which organ donation by an
incompetent minor would be adjudicated to be in that person’s best interests. Neverthe-
less, as indicated above, cases that have come before court in the United States suggest
that this might be possible.
reasoning, see Price, ‘Legal and Ethical Aspects’, pp. 341–342; S. Pattinson, Medical Law
and Ethics (Andover: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 449.
107. Pattinson, ‘Medical Law and Ethics’, p. 450.
108. Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 1 – Consent, para. 140. Available at: http://www.
hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code1consent.cfm?
faArea1¼customwidgets.content_view_1&cit_id¼652 (accessed 17 June 2016); Human
Tissue Authority Code of Practice 6, paras. 71–76.
109. See J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 453.
110. See Herring, ‘Medical Law and Ethics’, p. 454; E. Jackson, Medical Law. Text, Cases, and
Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 635–636; G.T. Laurie, S.H.E.
Harmon and G. Porter. Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 590. This suggestion is also made in the Code of
Practice, where reference is made to the emotional, psychological, and social aspects of
the donation of bone marrow or stem cells as compared to the very small medical risks. See
Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 6, para. 78. Furthermore, this line of reasoning is
supported by the ruling in the case Re Y where bone marrow donation by an incompetent
adult for the treatment of her sick sister was authorized on the grounds that this would be in
the social and emotional interests of the incompetent. See Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone
Marrow Donation), Fam 110 (1997).
111. In the case Re Y, Justice Connell stated obiter that, although he had authorized bone marrow
donation by the mentally incompetent person, it would be doubtful that cases involving
more intrusive surgery, such as organ donation, could also be in an incompetent person’s
best interests.
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Concluding remarks
Our study, which is the first in-depth comparative analysis of the regulations on living
tissue and organ donation by minors in Europe, paints a heterogeneous picture (see
Table 1). Living tissue donation by minors is allowed in all 30 countries under consid-
eration. In 27 of them, the restrictions as laid down in the Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine are largely respected.112 Although only 19 of these countries are bound
by the Convention, it is clear that its provisions have also greatly influenced the regu-
lation in several nonratifying states. The main differences concern the type of indepen-
dent body which should be solicited to grant final approval and the types of permissible
relationship between donor and recipient. With regard to the latter, it was observed that
several countries that have ratified the Convention go beyond its restriction which allows
donation only to sibling, without, however, having submitted a reservation in this regard.
By contrast, Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have opted for a different
approach. The Swedish and British regulations do not contain detailed provisions for
living tissue donation by minors but leave it to the independent body to decide in the
minor’s best interests. In Belgium, only minimal requirements are stipulated and no
approval from a competent independent body even needs to be obtained.
Living organ donation by minors is currently only allowed in Belgium, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. By limiting organ donation
to minors with the capacity to consent, the Norwegian regulation is still in conformity
with the Convention which it has ratified. As in Sweden, where also organ donation by
incompetent minors is allowed, living donation by minors in Norway is only permitted
under exceptional circumstances and subject to approval by an independent body that
has to decide on the basis of the minor’s best interests. In Ireland and the United
Kingdom, a clear differentiation is made between competent and incompetent minors.
Although competent minors are allowed to consent to living organ donation, uncertainty
exists as to the need to obtain a court order and, in Ireland, additional authorization from
the parents. In Belgium, only minors 12 years or over who are capable of expressing their
will are allowed to donate an organ, if they consent to the procedure and a pluridisci-
plinary committee at the level of the transplant hospital has given approval. The Belgian
law only allows these competent minors to donate a part of their liver.
Compared to the United States, the legal approach taken in most European countries
is markedly more restrictive. As we have indicated above, we completely agree that a
cautious approach is warranted in view of the risks that may be involved in the donation,
the conflict of interests that may exist on the part of the parents, and the position of
vulnerability of minors who are solicited to become living donors. However, we consider
the dominant approach in Europe to be unnecessarily strict. It could even be argued that
this dominant approach is difficult to reconcile with the central tenet of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child that, in all actions involving children, their best interests must
112. This is the case for Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland.
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be a primary consideration and their wishes should be given due weight in accordance
with their age and maturity. Indeed, we would suggest that the latter standard calls for
allowing living donation by minors under circumstances that in most European countries
would not be legally acceptable grounds for donation. As has been revealed in the
relevant United States case law, exceptional circumstances may arise where the minor
donor will likely accrue psychosocial benefits that significantly outweigh the risks
involved. Categorically refusing to consider a minor as living donor even if this would
under these extraordinary circumstances be in that person’s best interests may fail to
achieve the purpose of protection.
In this light, we suggest that European countries could benefit from the balanced
approach advocated in the professional guidelines issued by the American Academy of
Pediatrics. Alternatively, the conditions as laid down in the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine for living tissue donation by persons unable to consent could
be made applicable not only to living tissue but also to living organ donation by minors.
As a result, living donation by minors would be allowed when this exceptionally would
be in their best interests subject to a range of very stringent safeguards.113 First, donation
by the minor should be the solution of last resort. Second, there should be a high like-
lihood that the transplantation will be successful. Third, the foreseeable risks to the donor
should be acceptable when compared to the expected benefits to the donor and the
recipient. In this regard, living liver donation by minors will generally not be allowed.114
As highlighted in the Spanish case of Gabriela, an exception to this rule may occur in the
context of minor parent-to-child donation, due to the enormous psychological benefits
that parents will experience by saving the life of their child. Fourth, psychological
benefits that are nonspeculative and highly significant should reasonably be expected
to accrue to the donor. Fifth, the donor and the recipient should have a degree of
emotional intimacy that would make these kinds of psychological benefits likely. As
demonstrated by the position taken by many ratifying states of the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine regarding living tissue donation by minors, this implies that
donation exceptionally would not need to be restricted to siblings but could also target
other loved ones. Sixth, the minor should be involved to the greatest possible extent in
the decision-making process and the removal should not be carried out if that person
objects. Seventh and final, parental permission and, preferably, approval by a competent
body should be obtained.
In view of the tendency to grant mature minors a high degree of self-determination in
medical decision-making, we should also assess whether mature minors should be
113. Some of us have argued for a broadly similar solution as far as living donation by mentally
incompetent adults is concerned. See K. Van Assche, G. Genicot and S. Sterckx, ‘Using
Mentally Incompetent Adults as Living Organ Donors: Widely Diverging Regulations in
Europe’, European Journal of Health Law 19(5) (2012), pp. 441–466; K. Van Assche, G.
Genicot and S. Sterckx, ‘Living Organ Procurement from the Mentally Incompetent: The
Need for More Appropriate Guidelines’, Bioethics 28(3) (2014), pp. 101–109.
114. For a more in-depth discussion, see L. Capitaine, K. Thys, K. Van Assche, et al. ‘Should
Minors Be Considered as Potential Living Liver Donors?’, Liver Transplantation 19(6)
(2013), pp. 649–655.
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subject to less restrictive conditions. As we have seen, in countries where minors above a
fixed cutoff age are deemed able to consent to living tissue or organ donation, they are
still subject to the same conditions that govern living donation by immature minors. In
this case, the only difference will be that the mature minor’s consent will be needed,
whereas from the immature minor assent will be sought. Parental authorization and,
where a competent body needs to be petitioned, the approval thereof, will always also
be needed. Only in the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent in Ireland, does legal
uncertainty exist as to whether, in the context of living donation, mature minors should
be treated similarly to immature minors or to adults. However, as highlighted by the
examples set by the US states of Alabama, Michigan, and Wisconsin, it can be argued
that the mature minor doctrine should exceptionally also be extended to living donation.
If we are to determine whether minors from a certain age onward should be granted
adult-like rights to proceed to living tissue or organ donation, instead of being held to the
same protective regime as immature minors, we must ascertain whether they possess
sufficient capacity to make this decision. In our opinion, the question as to whether some
minors may have the capacity to consent for themselves will depend on the complexity
and consequences of the particular decision-making process. This decision-relative inter-
pretation of competence entails that the level of decisional capacity required from the
minor will need to increase in accordance both with the challenges involved in reaching
the medical decision at hand and with the risks involved in the resulting intervention.
Although, as a rule, minors beyond the age of 14 display adult-like levels of cognitive
maturity,115 adolescents do not yet possess levels of psychosocial maturity comparable
to those of adults.116 Since they are more susceptible to social coercion, tend to under-
estimate the potential risks involved in their behavior, are inclined to disregard the long-
term impacts of their decisions and are more prone to impulsivity, adolescents should
only be considered sufficiently competent to make decisions that are not strongly influ-
enced by any of these factors.
Consequently, to the extent that the particular context of living donation is likely to
result in significant immediate and long-term risks and exhibits characteristics that
increase the probability that social pressure occurs and an urgent decision is required,
adolescents should not be allowed to make an autonomous decision. Due to the very
limited risks involved, it could be convincingly argued that at least some adolescents
may be sufficiently mature to independently decide upon the donation of bone marrow or
hematopoietic stem cells. This line of reasoning lends support to the regulatory approach
taken in Alabama and Wisconsin.
By contrast, it is reasonable to assume that many, if not all, of the above-mentioned
factors feature prominently in a living organ donation decision. We should, therefore,
demand a high level of psychosocial maturity in addition to cognitive maturity where
115. L.A. Weithorn and S.B. Campbell, ‘The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make
Informed Treatment Decisions’, Child Development 53(6) (1982), pp. 1589–1598.
116. L. Steinberg, E. Cauffman, J. Woolard, et al. ‘Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?
Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA ‘‘Flip-
Flop’’’, American Psychologist 64(7) (2009), pp. 583–594.
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living kidney donation is considered and an even higher level where living liver donation
is contemplated.117 In this light, we have to conclude that the concept of mature minors is
of limited applicability in the context of organ donation. Although living kidney dona-
tion is not as risky a procedure as living liver donation, it would still require a level of
maturity which cannot readily be presumed in adolescents. In this respect, it should be
recalled that, in the UK case of Re W, Lord Donaldson regarded it as highly improbable
that a minor would be considered as being sufficiently competent to be able to consent to
kidney donation. Consequently, as has been proposed in the relevant Code of Practice
issued by the Human Tissue Authority in the United Kingdom, we would do well to
adopt a cautionary approach and to not treat adolescents as adults in the context of living
kidney donation.
In sum, taking into account the particularities of living donation and the fact that
minors have important vulnerabilities as compared to adult donor candidates, a high
standard of legal protection is required where living donation by minors is considered.
However, although a cautious approach is absolutely necessary, minors should under
exceptional circumstances still be allowed to donate where this would be clearly in their
best interests. Therefore, we suggest that European countries that currently take a pro-
hibitive approach would amend their regulations accordingly and consider legal harmo-
nization that would be beneficial to potential minor donors.
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